A Comparative Survey of Products Liability Law
as Applied to Motor Vehicles: Introduction by Sommerich, Otto C.
A Comparative Survey of Products
Liability Law as Applied to Motor
Vehicles *
Introduction
OTTO C. SOMMERICH t
Products liability law in the United States has run the gamut
from liability in negligence, only for fault, and in contract only on a
basis of privity, to strict liability without restrictions of fault or the
necessity of privity in contract.' Its pace of development is as
astonishing as the growth of the U.S. gross national product and
sometimes as bewildering as the complex technology for the marketing
and distribution of enormous quantities of products.2
Nor is the end in sight, for we are living witnesses to the persua-
sion that a manufacturer should assume absolute liability for any
damage on the theory that he should assimilate the risk for such
damages in the ordinary cost of doing business.'
* The International Lawyer is grateful for the special editorial assistance of
Captain Eddy James Rogers, Jr., QMC, for this series of articles. Captain
Rogers, a graduate of Harvard Law School and a member of the Texas
Bar, is now serving with the United States Army at Fort Lee, Virginia,
where he is teaching public contract law and general business law.
t Member of the New York Bar since 1899, L.L.B. Columbia University
Law School, and chairman of the Section's Committee on European Law.
'Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, summarizes the
extensions of the original rule.
2 Wm. E. Knepper, "About Tomorrow's Tort Trends," N.Y.L.J. 2/21/1967,
p. 1, refers to "the frenzy of the 'Law Explosion.' "
' A note in the California Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 4 (1966), p. 707, pays
tribute to the work of Prof. Ehrenzweig and Justice Traynor in advancing this
concept. "The most generally accepted argument advanced in support of
absolute liability on the part of a manufacturer is nothing more than a
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Indeed, this state of legal affairs has invited comment from
competent sources that present principles of products liability con-
travene "legal tradition that goes back centuries" ' and that we are
adrift in a sea of uncertainty and unpredictability in the law.'
The development of the law of products liability appears to be in
proportion to the social awareness that a defective product carries with
it the "potency of danger" 6 and damage and that the cost of injuries
resulting from its use should be borne by the manufacturer who put
the product on the market and who invited its use, rather than upon
uninsured persons who are powerless to protect themselves and are
strongly limited in the possibility of proving fault within the technical
requirements of the rules of evidence.7
Yet, this development has been comparatively recent. As late
as 1905, the British courts in Earl v. Lubbock (L.R.[1905] 1 K.B.
253) returned to the doctrine of Winterbottom v. Wright (10 M. & W.
109), that a third party could not recover from a manufacturer for a
latent defect in the latter's product.
This bulwark and citadel ' of privity of contract was taken by
storm and demolished by Judge Cardozo in 1916 in MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co. (217 N.Y. 382) who "put aside the notion that
the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of negli-
gence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else." 9
The manufacturer was held "responsible for the finished product" 10
and was charged with the knowledge "that in the usual course of
events the danger will be shared by others than the buyer." 11 The
distillation of the theory of risk distribution through the price structure which
Professor Ehrenzweig and Justice Traynor were advancing a decade ago."
4 Lee S. Kreindler, Chairman of Aviation Committee of American Trial
Lawyers Association, as reported in The New York Times, April 23, 1966,
p. 62.
Warren Freedman, "Products Liability Today, Whither Thou Goest, I Will
Go," an address delivered in Honolulu, 1967, before the A.B.A. Section on
Corporation, Banking and Business Law, reprinted in N.Y.L.J. 8/9/1967, p. 4.
O MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 387.
7 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 67; Goldberg v. Kollsman
Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 437; Keeton, "Products Liability-Liability
Without Fault and The Requirement of a Defect," 41 Texas L.Rev. 855 (1963).
8 Prosser, "The Assult Upon The Citadel (Strict Liability To The Con-
sumer)," 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960).
9 Id., p. 390.
10 Id., p. 394.
11 Id., p. 389.
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principle was to be applied to "whatever the needs of life in a develop-
ing civilization require them to be." 12
Justice Frankfurter credits this decision with becoming a radiat-
ing principle and an established part of the law of torts.13 It has clearly
culminated in the doctrine which appears in the Restatement of the
Law of Torts (Second) which today has virtually the force of law: 14
Sec. 402A-SPECIAL LIABILITY OF SELLER OF PROD-
UCT FOR PHYSICAL HARM TO USER OR
CONSUMER.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling such
a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepara-
tion and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relationship with the seller ...
The limitation in Subdivision "(1)" that the product be "unrea-
sonably dangerous" has tended to limit the application of strict tort
liability to personal injury cases.1" Recovery for economic loss has
largely been governed by the principles now found in the following
sections of the Uniform Commercial Code:
2-315. IMPLIED WARRANTY: FITNESS FOR PARTICU-
LAR PURPOSE.
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to
know any particular purpose for which the goods are required
and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to
select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or
modified under the next section an implied warranty that the
12 Id., p. 391.
13 Justice Frankfurter, "Law and Men," pp. 196, 198, in a biographical sketch
of Justice Cardozo.
14 Rheingold, "What Are The Consumer's 'Reasonable Expectations'?," The
Business Lawyer, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 589, 590.
11 Cumming, "Manufacturer's Responsibility For Defective Products: Con-
tinuing Controversy Over The Law To Be Applied," California L.Rev. Vol. 54,
No. 4 (1966), p. 1681; "Manufacturer's Strict Liability to Consumers for
Economic Loss," St. John's L.Rev., Vol. XLI, Jan. 1967, p. 408.
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goods shall be fit for such purpose. L. 1962, c. 553, eff. Sept. 27,
1964.
2-318. THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES OF WARRAN-
TIES EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to
any natural person who is in the family or household of his
buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect
that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods
and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A
seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
L. 1962, c. 553, eff. Sept. 27, 1964.
At the same time that the Uniform Commercial Code was
enacted in California in 1962, its courts enunciated in Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (59 Cal. 2d 57; 377 P.2d 897) a
doctrine of absolute liability in tort, holding a manufacturer absolutely
responsible for personal injuries resulting from a defective product.' "
But in 1965 the same courts held that the theory of absolute liability
in tort was unavailable as a vehicle for recovery of economic loss as
contrasted to recovery for personal injuries. 7 Yet, at virtually the
same time, New Jersey took an opposite point of view and held
that the theory of absolute liability in tort was available as a device
for the recovery of economic loss in a products liability case where
no personal injury or property damage had occurred.'"
The courts of other jurisdictions are no doubt now being occupied
with the swing from strict liability in tort to absolute liability in tort
where defective products are involved, and with the further question
whether the new theories, which apply in personal injury cases, are
equally valid when applied to economic loss cases.
While the pendulum swings, a very recent case in the United
States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit adds a fitting footnote
to MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co." and the subject of automobiles,
which Judge Cardozo there noted were designed to go 50 miles an
hour.'" In Schemel v. General Motors," a passenger in a car going
16 Although the phrase "strict liability in tort" has become the accepted
characterization of Greenman v. Yuba, Cumming (supra) believes that the
term "absolute liability in tort" is correct because no reference is made to any
defenses which the manufacturer might have if the case were tried under a
sales law approach.
'7 Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9 (1965).
1i Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52 (1965).
19 Supra.
20 Id., p. 391.
21 Not yet reported; decided 7/17/1967.
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115 miles per hour at the time of an accident sued General Motors
on the ground of negligence in building a vehicle which would go so
fast. The fascinating fact is that in a dissenting opinion, Judge Roger
Kiley held that "General Motors is chargeable with the duty of rea-
sonably foreseeing the probable dangers" of building a car capable
of high speeds. The majority opinion, however, held that the manu-
facturer's "duty is to avoid hidden defects and latent or concealed
dangers. He is not bound to anticipate and guard against grossly
careless misuse of his product." In the language of a periodical
which noted the decision, a tendency was found in the forums of
law to apply "responsibility at any speed" as well as "the tendency of
more and more courts in the U.S. to hold manufacturers to tougher
standards of liability when their products cause injury." 12
Both a practical and scholarly interest in the law of representa-
tive countries of Europe invite a comparison, and the accompanying
articles of members of the European Law Committee show an inter-
esting division of progress in those countries.
Because products liability includes such a vast array of litigation
and comment in so many different types of products, the subsequent
articles have limited themselves out of practical necessity to the field of
motor vehicles.2
In Germany we find that there is no products liability law as
known to America, and that liability is wholly based on fault. In the
words of Ernest C. Steefel, German law on the subject can, from
the American viewpoint, be reduced to "archaic gambits." Prof.
Ruth B. Ginsburg has found no case in point or even commentary
in Sweden directed specifically to the question. In Italy, according to
Messrs. Riccardo Gori-Montanelli and David A. Botwinik, the higher
courts and commentators agree that the manufacturer's sole liability
is his contractual one to the purchaser of the vehicle. As found by
Paul L. Baeck there is no liability without fault in Austria. Under-
standably, as ascertained by Isaac Shapiro there is no case or article
to be found in the Soviet Union in which the liability of the Soviet
manufacturer of motor vehicles is mentioned. The only cases he found
2- Time, Aug. 25, 1967, p. 48.
22 Daniel P. Moynihan has the following to say about automobiles, in
"Next: A New Auto Insurance Policy," The New York Times Magazine,
Aug. 27, 1967, pp. 26, 76: "The point is that the private automobile, as authors
Alan K. Campbell and Jesse Burkhead say, 'is undoubtedly the greatest generator
of externalities that civilization has ever known.' " Its only possible rival, they
add, would appear to be "warfare among nations."
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